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THE PROPOSED TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND
INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (TTIP): ISDS PROVISIONS,
RECONCILIATION, AND FUTURE TRADE IMPLICATIONS
ABSTRACT
On July 8, 2013, the United States and the European Union launched talks
for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, a proposed
international investment agreement. This agreement would create the world’s
largest free trade area and cover almost half of the entire global economic
output. Other research has concluded that increasingly global trade has led to
an increase in investment disputes between foreign investors and host nations
and stressed the importance of investor-state dispute settlement provisions.
Within an international investment agreement, investor-state dispute
settlements provide investors a means of holding foreign states accountable to
an international tribunal with repercussions of a binding, enforceable award
of compensation.
Even with a recognized public backlash, U.S. and EU leaders have publicly
stated their intention of including investor-state dispute settlement provisions
in the finalized TTIP and future international investment agreements, including
any future multilateral agreement on investment. A U.S. Model text includes
three significant changes that will impact the adoption of investor-state dispute
settlement provisions in the bilateral investment treaty: transparency; thirdparty involvement; and consideration for future multilateral appellate
procedures. The EU Draft text and corresponding negotiating directive
address the following issues: transparency, tribunal creation, enforcement of
arbitration awards and potential future appellate mechanisms. This Comment
provides original analysis on specific provisions regarding each of these issues
and seeks to prescribe reconciliation between the U.S. and EU texts. I find that
reconciliation is possible on all ISDS provisions of the proposed TTIP. Then, I
conclude with a summarization of all relevant discussions.
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INTRODUCTION
But I will say here and now, on this Day of Independence, that the
United States will be ready for a Declaration of Interdependence, that
we will be prepared to discuss with a united Europe the ways and
means of forming a concrete Atlantic partnership, a mutually
beneficial partnership between the new union now emerging in
Europe and the old American Union founded here 175 years ago . . .
All this will not be completed in a year, but let the world know it is
our goal.
—The 35th U.S. President, John F. Kennedy, 19621

On July 8, 2013 the United States and the European Union launched talks
for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP),2 a proposed
international trade and investment agreement (IIA).3 The TTIP would create
the world’s largest free trade area encompassing “about 50 percent of global
economic output, 30 percent of global trade and 20 percent of global foreign
direct investment,”4 potentially boosting “U.S. and EU economic growth by
more than $100 billion a year.”5 In addition to the economic increases that
could be realized by the U.S. and the EU, more commercial interaction will
inevitably lead to a greater amount of commercial disputes–an important issue
at stake for the TTIP and the global economy. U.S. and EU leaders have
publicly stated their intention of using negotiated ISDS provisions from the
TTIP in future IIA agreements. This Comment argues that the final ISDS
provisions in the TTIP are important for U.S.-EU trade, but may have future
implications for a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI). The
development of ISDS provisions in the TTIP has massive trade implications
influencing the $100 billion a year figure.6 Any influence the TTIP would have
on a possible future MAI could have even more massive implications. This
Comment is limited in scope to the U.S.-EU TTIP ISDS provisions. While

1

President John F. Kennedy, Speech at Independence Hall, (July 4, 1962).
Informal talks about a U.S.-EU Free Trade Agreement began in the 1990’s, but faltered as the U.S. and
the EU focused on creating agreements with emerging market states. Jack Ewing, Trade Deal Between U.S.
and Europe May Come to the Forefront, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/26/
business/global/trade-deal-between-us-europe-may-pick-up-steam.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
3 Doug Palmer, After Long Buildup, U.S.-EU Free Trade Talks Finally Begin, REUTERS (July 8, 2013),
www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USL2N0F71XS20130708. For the purposes of this paper, TTIP refers to a
proposed free trade agreement between the U.S. and the EU, while an IIA describes any general international
investment agreement.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
2
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there is a great amount of scholarly work surrounding ISDS provisions, this
Comment is currently the only known work centered on ISDS provisions of the
TTIP. As such, this Comment will consider the development of IIAs in the
U.S. and the EU, trace positions and objectives for both the U.S. and EU, and
analyze how finalized ISDS provisions within a U.S.-EU IIA may be
reconciled in the TTIP.
I. BACKGROUND
A. General Overview
IIAs in this Comment refer to free trade agreements (FTAs),7 bilateral
investment treaties (BITs), and other investment instruments negotiated and
concluded by member states (contracting states) to specific agreements.8
Before digressing into what is an IIA, it is important to note that before the
advent of IIAs in the middle of the twentieth century, there were only three
main ways that investors were able to gain remedy for any damages caused by
overt acts of a foreign state against the investor’s property or profits.9 As these
processes became burdensome to investors, states began executing IIAs.
7 FTAs may be designed and written to include investment chapters that are identical to the contents of a
state’s active BITs. Chang-fa Lo, A Comparison of BIT and the Investment Chapter of Free Trade Agreement
from Policy Perspective, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. AND POLICY 147, 165 (2008) (discussing that in
some cases a state’s BIT concerning investor/investment protections is directly inserted into an FTA as one
chapter concerned with investor/investment protection within the entire FTA agreement). For discussion
purposes, the investment chapter of an FTA is the equivalent of a BIT. Karen Halverson Cross, Converging
Trends in Investment Treaty Practice, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 151, 153 (2012). Specifically, the U.S.
State Department describes the similarity between the more than 40 BITs and the investment chapters of FTA
that the U.S. currently has in force. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, United States Concludes Review of
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (Apr. 20, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/
188198.htm. However, it is important to note that a BIT may be replaced by an investment chapter of an FTA,
but an FTA cannot be replaced with a BIT. Lo, supra, at 165. While international investment rules were not
included in early FTAs, the similarity between investment and trade negotiation is becoming more
commonplace, and parties to the IIA tend to discretionarily use the contents of a BIT within an FTA. Cross,
supra, at 153–58.
8 SHAYERAHILIAS AKHTAR & MARTIN A WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43052, U.S.
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 (2013).
9 Christopher N. Camponovo, Dispute Settlement and the OECD Multilateral Agreement On Investment,
1 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 181, 199–200 (1996). In the absence of a treaty framework providing for
dispute resolution, investors have three means of obtaining redress for injuries caused by the illegal acts of a
foreign nation. First, the investor could go to the local courts of the host state. Id. Second, the investor may
submit a claim to a local court in the investor’s home state. Id. Finally, the investor may petition for espousal,
hoping the investor’s home state will “bring the matter before the ICJ . . . or pursue traditional customary
international law self-help remedies of retorsion, countermeasures, or suspension or termination of a treaty.”
Id. These three processes became burdensome to investors, and states began executing IIAs. Id.
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While IIAs are discussed concurrently in this Comment, there are key
distinctions between BITs and FTAs.10 A BIT is a contractual agreement
between two states to govern the codification of rules and handling of
investment disputes between a member state and the individuals and
companies of the other member state.11 An FTA is a trade arrangement
between two or more countries for the purpose of providing all parties to the
deal a preferential treatment in trade by removing tariffs and nontariff barriers
between members of the agreement.12 When included in an IIA, these
agreements typically include two systems for dispute resolution between
member states set up within the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
provisions: one for disputes between the member states and one for disputes
between private investors from a member state against the other member
state.13
Modern IIAs usually contain specific ISDS provisions to provide a forum
ensuring host states uphold public treaties with regard to international
investments for investors from a home state.14 Because investment amounts
can be quite large when dealing with regulations, natural resource development
and procurement, IIAs use ISDS provisions to offer a certain level of security
to investors from developed countries when doing business in host states.15 It
10 Within the realm of international law, international investment treaties are unique in providing
individuals recourse against another state. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really
Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 88
(2005).
11 Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract, Treaty
Violations, and the Divide Between Developing and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14
GEO. MASON L. REV. 137, 137 (2006).
12 WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31356, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: IMPACT ON U.S.
TRADE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. TRADE POLICY 1–2 (2010). Specifically, Article XXIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 describes an FTA as an accord in which two or more countries agree to
remove substantially all “restrictive regulations of commerce” in trade for products originating within the
contracting states. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154.
13 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 10, at 87–88. While not as many FTAs are signed as BITs, FTAs also
typically include similar procedures to BITs for settling disputes arising between member states to the
agreement and between member states and other member states’ investors. Cooper, supra note 12, at 1.
14 AKHTAR & WEISS, supra note 8, at 1 (describing home state and host states involved in BITs and
investment chapters of FTAs as creating “binding reciprocal agreements that promote and protect investors of
one state (home) in the territory of another (host) by establishing a number of basic protections”). These
provisions tend to be instituted by developed countries where corporations are concerned about the rule of law
and access to “fair” or “just” courts in a host state. Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties,
Credible Commitment, and the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 807–08 (2008).
15 See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 10, at 83.
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follows that the reasons most developed countries establish IIAs are to secure
“improved market access; protection from discriminatory, expropriatory, or
otherwise harmful government treatment; . . . a mechanism to pursue binding
international arbitration for breaches of the treaty . . . improve investment
climates, promote market-based economic reform, and strengthen the rule of
law.”16 With these investment protection provisions and their prevalence,17
IIAs have become the “dominant international vehicle through which
investment is regulated.”18
In early IIAs, state interests typically fell into two distinct categories:
capital-exporting states and capital-importing states.19 Now, more IIAs are
executed between two or more capital-exporting or developed states, whereby
all parties seek strong protections for their home investors while protecting
domestic sovereignty and national public interest.20
B. International Investment Agreements
Before international investment law became more standardized, foreign
investors relied on their home government to diplomatically resolve disputes
with host states.21 It was a difficult process for investors to convince home
states to advocate on their behalf, depending on the geopolitical ties and
current diplomacy between state governments.22

16 United States Adopts New Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 662, 663 (2012).
While IIAs typically promote trade liberalization, some also include ISDS provisions to protect member states’
domestic investors from losing investment deals to other member states’ investors with preferential treatment
arrangements. Cooper, supra note 12, at 3.
17 AKHTAR & WEISS, supra note 8, at 1 (highlighting that 3,000 global BITs and 12 out of the 14 U.S.
FTAs all contain investment protection provisions).
18 Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 687 (1998).
19 Cross, supra note 7, at 154. Further background on this is outside the scope of this Comment as it is
universally accepted that both the U.S. and the EU are regarded as developed states. Captial-exporting states
are more likely to be developed states, which sought to negotiate firm protections for their home investors
seeking foreign direct investment (FDI); and capital-importing states, more likely to be developing states,
which sought to negotiate protections of domestic sovereignty and national public interest. See id.
20 Carrie E. Anderer, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the EU Legal Order: Implications of the Lisbon
Treaty, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 851, 856–57 (2010).
21 Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 391,
407 (2012).
22 Id.
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1. History of IIAs
As a result of this dearth of investor protection, investors began lobbying
their home states in the middle of the 20th century to form concession
contracts with stipulations on arbitration and international choice of law.23
However, these first international arbitration tribunals lacked the power of
compulsory jurisdiction and the power to enforce decisions.24 As a result,
nations created and signed two important international conventions.
First, The New York Convention25 bound all member states to recognize
arbitration awards and to enforce both domestic and international arbitration
awards for all other member states.26 Consequently, the first IIA was a BIT
signed in 1959 between the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan.27
Beginning in the 1960s, the investment and commercial concerns of
domestic investors losing investments to foreign government expropriation28
prompted more states to negotiate and sign IIAs. These IIAs mandated national
court jurisdiction over specific types of investment disputes.29 These tribunals
sought to provide an efficient and impartial way to resolve disputes, especially
disputes affecting “international trade and investment.”30 The ICSID
Convention, also known as the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, codified these and

23

Id. at 407–08.
See supra Part I.A.
25 U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517.
26 Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 827 (2012); see also
ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 10 (1981) (“[T]he New York Convention is in essence limited to two aspects of
international commercial arbitration: the enforcement of those arbitration agreements which come within its
purview (Art. II(3)) and the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (Arts. I and III-VI).”). In 1990, the
Convention had 80 contracting states. Born, supra, at 827. In 2014, it had 150 parties. Status: Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, http://www.
uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2013).
27 Anderer, supra note 20, at 856.
28 Id. at 855 (citing Rodney Neufeld, Trade and Investment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 636–37 (Daniel Bethlehem et al. eds., 2009) (stating that “direct
expropriation involves the taking of an investment by the host State through seizure of the property or interest,
or through its compulsory transfer, for example, to a state-owned enterprise or domestic investor . . . an
indirect expropriation often consists of a series of government acts that has the effect of rendering the
investor’s property rights useless”)).
29 Born, supra note 26, at 793.
30 Id. at 819.
24
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future tribunal judgments in 1965.31 Specifically, the ICSID creates a specific
legal procedure for the arbitration of disputes, mainly commercial in nature,
“arising between a contracting state and foreign investors who are nationals of
another contracting state.”32 Arbitration under the rules (and enforcement
benefits) of the ICSID Convention is only available if both parties to the
dispute have agreed to submit to ICSID arbitration, usually through an IIA.33
Both the New York and ICSID Conventions help create a decentralized
mechanism allowing for the set of procedures used in international arbitration
and the adequate enforcement of arbitration awards.34
While not all countries participated in IIAs in the 1950s and 1960s, many
states eventually enacted strong sovereign immunity laws during the 1980s to
grant domestic courts sole jurisdiction over matters involving “commercial
activities, real property, expropriatory actions, and . . . disputes in which states
had waived their immunity, particularly through arbitration agreements.”35 As
a result of foreign states’ lost ability to consent (or not) to litigation, more
states began to privately agree to resolve disputes related to commerce,
finance, and individual investors by way of international commercial
arbitration.36 This led to international arbitration as the preferred method for
resolving both state-state and investor-state disputes.37
2. Purpose and Impact of Negotiating IIAs
IIAs are negotiated to balance the interests of a government’s economic
autonomy versus a private investor’s rights.38 IIAs are important because
without an agreement in place for investor-state disputes, international
tribunals have neither mandatory jurisdiction nor mandatory enforcement
31 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States,
opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 (1965). Now under the control of the World Bank, the
ICSID Convention promotes arbitration as a viable solution to international investment disputes through a
written set of procedures. Id. As of 2012, there were 146 signatories to the Convention. Born, supra note 26, at
821–36.
32 Born, supra note 26, at 832.
33 Id. Award enforcement occurs through the procedures listed in the ICSID Convention, but also
provides optional enforcement mechanisms through a contracting state’s national courts. See id.
34 Id. at 836.
35 Id. at 822.
36 Id. at 823, 826.
37 Id. at 827.
38 Sara Jamieson, A Model Future: The Future of Foreign Direct Investment and Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 53 S. TEX. L. REV. 605, 607 (2012). IIAs determine the extent states have sovereignty to enforce
jurisdiction over foreign investors within its domestic legal system. Id.
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mechanisms.39 Because of the enforceable nature of these agreements, there are
both proponents40 and critics.41
There are several procedural concerns raised about the process of
international arbitration through IIAs that states seek to fix through
negotiations. First, investment arbitration has been argued to be more favorable
to foreign investors than domestic investors.42 Second, critics cite to a problem
concerning a lack of transparency in the process.43 Third, international
arbitration, through lack of transparency and other means, may lack
consistency on legal standards.44 Fourth, critics cite the inability to provide
amicus curiae briefs as an issue.45 Fifth, the lack of appellate review of
international arbitration decisions has been condemned.46 Finally, the decisions
of international arbitration can be seen as weakening domestic regulatory
rights.47 While each of these criticisms is meritorious to different stakeholders,
current negotiations and agreements are seeking to reduce or eliminate their
effect on arbitration judgments and awards.

39 Born, supra note 26, at 778. See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in
International Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 13 (2005) (arguing that international tribunals are more akin to
domestic arbitrators than courts because members can choose to ignore them and international tribunals cannot
depend on enforcement); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 285–86 (1997) (finding that international dispute resolution
lacks both the power to compel and the ability to coerce compliance). Many detailed analyses have debated the
influence of IIA ISDS provisions on business investment. See also Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do
Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 (10) World
Development 1567, 1567 (2005)); Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 10, at 69; Susan Rose-Ackerman &
Jennifer Tobin, When BITs Have Some Bite: The Political-Economic Environment for Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 6 REV. INT’L ORGS. 1 (2006); Yackee, Credible Commitment, supra note 14, at 807–08.
Contemporary IIAs typically require member states to formally bind themselves to arbitration in future
disputes as part of their agreement. Born, supra note 26, at 829.
40 K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on Their Origin, Purposes,
and General Treatment Standards, 4 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW 105, 112 (1986).
41 Profiting from Injustice: How law firms, arbitrators and financiers are fuelling an investment
arbitration boom, CORP. EUR. OBSERVATORY (Nov. 27, 2012), available at http://corporateeurope.org/trade/
2012/11/profiting-injustice.
42 Born, supra note 26, at 842.
43 Id. at 842–43.
44 Id.; see also Susan Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005).
45 Born, supra note 26, at 843.
46 Id.
47 Neumayer & Spess, supra note 39, at 1571.
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C. Investor State Dispute Settlement Provisions
1. History of ISDS Provisions
“Before WWII, most states adopted legislation providing ‘absolute
immunity’” from relinquishing property in their state courts.48 These policies
forced any foreign investor with commercial disputes to rely on diplomatic
negotiations by their home state as a way to resolve claims.49 Over time,
developed nations began instituting reforms to change this post-WWII absolute
immunity to restrictive immunity.50 By the 1980s, many developed and
developing states enacted legislation providing their national court system
“jurisdiction over disputes involving commercial activities, real property,
expropriatory actions, and a limited number of other specified actions, as well
as over disputes in which states had waived their immunity, particularly
through arbitration agreements.”51 These arbitration agreements, almost always
present in modern IIAs, mandate that arbitration awards will be recognized by
parties to the agreement and provide clearly defined enforcement
mechanisms.52 These are often under the auspices of the New York
Convention and ICSID.53 One example can include coercive enforcement
against state property.54
Generally, ISDS provisions are executed as a way to protect foreign
investors from host state expropriation.55 Expropriation involves a host state
directly or indirectly nationalizing an investment of a foreign investor.56 States

48

Born, supra note 26, at 820.
Id. This often was a careful balance between both states that required political capital and resulted in
inaccurate remedies. Id.
50 Id. at 821–22.
51 Id. at 822.
52 Id. at 837. The enforcement procedures depend on whether the conflicting parties are both members of
the ICSID Convention or if enforcement procedures fall under the New York Convention. Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Guzman, supra note 18, at 659–60 (discussing that international investors rely on international law
because foreign domestic laws can change due to future circumstances and IIAs constrain host state behavior
according to international conventions).
56 See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, art. 1110
(1993). Recent examples of expropriation disputes include: (1) a host state’s right to manage water resources
of a privately held company (Azurix Corp. v. Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12), a host state’s legislation
prohibiting the operation of a nuclear plant (Vattenfall AB (Swed.) v. Ger., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12); and
a host state’s right to protect public health at the expense of corporate branding on products (Philip Morris
Asia Lmtd. v. Austl., UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012–12). For a more ISDS provisions being discussed in
49
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negotiate IIAs to secure investor protection of neutral international dispute
arbitration by including provisions against both direct and indirect
expropriation.57
Because customary law differs on which of the two doctrines are used to
determine state and investor rights and obligations, negotiations on arbitration
and ISDS provisions in IIAs are difficult and center on two historical
doctrines: the Hull Rule and the Calvo Doctrine.58 IIAs became a way for
countries to choose whether to bind themselves to international arbitration
instead of relying on customary international law to determine which of these
two doctrines shall be used.59
International arbitration, due to states seeking to avoid either the Hull Rule
or Calvo Doctrine to resolve disputes, is becoming increasingly more
important to international trade.60 As a result of IIAs providing investors both a
neutral and efficient way to resolve disputes with host states,61 investor-state
arbitration became the preeminent form of dispute resolution agreed upon in
IIAs in the 1990s.62 A 2005 review of 1755 treaties found that 38% of the
current events, see also A Transatlantic Corporate Bill of Rights, CORP. EUR. OBSERVATORY (June 3, 2013),
available at http://corporateeurope.org/trade/2013/06/transatlantic-corporate-bill-rights.
57 Lo, supra note 7, at 152. IIAs all mandate that legal expropriation only occurs when it is: (1) done for
a public purpose; (2) does not discriminate against a foreign investor; (3) involves a “prompt, adequate, and
effective” payment of compensation; and (4) is in agreement with the due process of law. Id. Regarding
payment of compensation, most IIAs require payment to also be equal to the fair market value of the
expropriated investment at a time before the expropriation takes place with the value reflected before the
taking and with an investor’s opportunity to freely transfer the payment to their home state. Id.
58 Neumayer & Spess, supra note 39, at 1569–70. The Hull Rule, argued to be customary international
law mostly by developed states, declares foreign investors should receive “prompt, adequate and effective
compensation” when a host state expropriates investments or resources. Rudolf Dolzer, New Foundations of
the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 553, 558 (1981); Ryan J. Bubb & Susan RoseAckerman, BITs and Bargains: Strategic Aspects of Bilateral and Multilateral Regulation of Foreign
Investment, 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 291, 294 (2007). Alternatively, the Calvo Doctrine argued to be
customary international law by mostly developing states, conditions that foreign investors should be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of host state courts with no more favorable rights than the host state’s nationals. R.
Dolzer, supra, at 560; Bubb & Rose-Ackerman, supra, at 294. UN General Assembly Resolution 3171, similar
to the Calvo Doctrine, declared that states should have the right to use their national legislature to determine
where international disputes would be settled, how much compensation would be due to investors, and which
way the compensation would be paid. G.A. Res. 3171, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1973), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 238 (1974).
59 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 10, at 86–87.
60 Id. at 88. “[I]nternational commercial and investment arbitrations, backed by the possibility of
litigation in national courts against foreign states, play a central role in contemporary international trade and
investment.” Born, supra note 26, at 864.
61 See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 10.
62 Bubb & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 58, at 296.
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treaties (672) have a provision for dispute resolution.63 Furthermore, 20% of
the total amount of treaties (367) contains a binding dispute-resolution
provision,64 with 94% of those (348) having an arbitration clause.65 As the
number of IIAs grow and investor-state arbitration becomes the default dispute
resolution method within those agreements, ISDS provisions will become
increasingly more important as contracting parties seek to protect their citizens
investing abroad.
2. Purpose of ISDS
The ISDS provisions of IIAs allow foreign investors to initiate international
arbitration claims against host states for violations investment agreement
violations.66 Specifically, ISDS provisions within an IIA offer investors a
means of holding host states accountable to an international tribunal with
repercussions of a binding, enforceable award of compensation.67 This is
important because investor-state dispute provisions are the only way under
international law providing investors a remedy for injuries due to “trade law
violations . . . without regard to the concerns and interests of their source
countries.”68 This ability for investors to bring claims against host states is one
of the strongest protections an IIA affords investment because international
arbitration tribunals are known for providing “lengthy, reasoned, and scholarly
decisions that form part of the jurisprudence of this emerging international
investment law and serve to solidify and give force” to IIA provisions.69
Proponents of ISDS provisions argue it may be difficult for foreign
investors to find adequate legal remedies through a host state for matters
concerning their FDI.70 ISDS provisions allow these foreign investors to
prevent any biases in the host state’s domestic courts by filing their claims
outside the jurisdiction of the host state.71 Scholarly interest in these provisions

63

Born, supra note 26, at 861.
Id. at 861–62.
65 Id. at 862.
66 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 10, at 88.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Stephen M. Schwebel, The Overwhelming Merits of Bilateral Investment Agreements, 32 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 263, 263 (2009).
71 Anderer, supra note 20, at 860; see also George M. von Mehren, Claudia T. Salmon, & Asparia A.
Parautsas, Navigating Through Investor-State Arbitrations - An Overview of Bilateral Investment Treaty
Claims, 59 DISP. RESOL. J. 69, 70 (1994).
64
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is based on the idea that these provisions solve the “central problématique of
host state-foreign investor relations: that the host state will opportunistically
interfere with the investment’s profitability once the investment has been
sunk.”72 Thus, negotiated ISDS provisions normally provide a set of legally
enforceable rules to reduce risk due to expropriation that an investor considers
before initiating any investments.73 However, critics highlight three reasons
ISDS provisions should have little effect on investor decisions: legal
ignorance, legal pluralism, and legal ambiguity.74 Instead, some scholars argue
investors may be better served through investment insurance, rather than
considering an in-depth analysis of IIA ISDS provisions.75
3. Substantive Effects of ISDS Provisions
The ISDS provisions within IIAs also consider the following substantive
effects on the following categories: protection from expropriation, regulation
of foreign direct investment, fairness between member states, and trade
creation.76
First, expropriation provisions seek to protect foreign investors from a
nation enacting domestic law aimed at directly or indirectly changing
investment contracts between the nation and the foreign investor.77 These
provisions are triggered by either a change in domestic law or situations in

72

Yackee, Credible Commitment, supra note 14, at 807.
von Mehren, supra note 71, at 72.
74 Yackee, Credible Commitment, supra note 14, at 810. Legal ignorance is premised on the idea that
foreign investors have little knowledge of both the provisions within IIAs and impact of those provisions on
their investments. Id. Moreover, when individuals in an organization follow IIA agreements, that information
may not pass through to the people making investment decisions. Id. Legal pluralism occurs because
investments do not happen in a vacuum and states agreeing to investment are likely to treat disputes favorably
to investors as they seek future investments in their territory. Id. at 811. Finally, legal ambiguity arises because
the ISDS provisions in IIAs “consist almost entirely of highly ambiguous standards of uncertain meaning and
application.” Id. at 812.
75 Id. at 822 (“Almost all major capital-exporting states have set up state-sponsored or state-subsidized
insurance programs for their foreign investors, supported by a network of investment-guarantee treaties. The
United States’ Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) regularly issues millions of dollars in
insurance against expropriation, currency transfer, and other ‘political’ risks. The World Bank has also
recently entered the arena through its Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and as of February
2006 has issued more than 14 billion dollars’ worth of coverage. Insurance programs may actually be
preferable to BITs as a risk-reducing device, as investors are guaranteed compensation from the insurer
independent of the host state’s willingness or ability to pay damages.”).
76 Gudgeon, supra note 40, at 110–12.
77 Id. at 126.
73
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which a nation’s government retakes property for purposes outside the scope of
necessity.78
Second, IIAs provide ways for investors to invest their resources for the
highest return in foreign member states to the agreement.79 This investment,
known as foreign direct investment (FDI), is considered the “lifeblood of the
global economy.”80 The prevailing theory regarding FDI and IIAs is “credible
commitment.”81
Third, states now seek IIAs “to ensure the impartial adjudication of
disputes through the application of the terms of the parties’ agreement,
objective legal principles, and neutral procedural rules, rather than through
contests of political, diplomatic, or similar pressure.”82
Fourth, the difference in IIA trade negotiation typically comes in two
forms: trade creation and trade diversion. First, trade creation occurs through
IIAs when a country replaces a domestically produced good with a foreign
good because the IIA makes the importation of the good cheaper than its
production.83 Second, trade diversion occurs through IIAs when a country
replaces an imported good by an efficient foreign producer with an inefficient
member of the IIA because the removal of tariffs and economic barriers makes
it cheaper to import the inefficiently produced good from the member
country.84

78 Id. at 128. Most IIAs only stipulate that foreign investors only be provided equal treatment to domestic
investors for any consequences to investment caused by war or armed conflict, as opposed to treating these
events as expropriation. Id. at 127–28 (noting that provisions in IIAs typically do not require foreign
governments to compensate investors in cash, but rather just be afforded the same treatment as domestic
investors).
79 Anderer, supra note 20, at 861.
80 Id. at 851.
81 Guzman, supra note 18, at 658–59. This theory highlights that a state can rationally give up its
sovereignty over foreign investors if that is necessary to become or remain competitive for FDI. Yackee,
Investment Law Agency, supra note 21, at 400. However, there exists a strong debate whether this theory
accurately describes why states give up sovereignty for FDI and whether entering into IIAs actually provides a
realized increase in FDI to a host state. See id.
82 Born, supra note 26, at 828.
83 Cooper, supra note 12, at 9. An increase in economic welfare is realized because resources of member
states are shifted to their most efficient uses. Id.
84 Id. Alternatively, there are some concerns about efficient trade due to BITs and FTAs concerning trade
diversion, when a party to an IIA chooses to import a less efficient good from another member state rather than
a non-member state due to either the agreement or eliminated tariff. Id.
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4. Introduction to Specific ISDS Provisions
IIAs all contain provisions establishing the treatment of investors,
mandating requirements for expropriation and nationalization of investments,
codifying rules regarding financial transfers and payment between parties of
different states, and providing for dispute settlement mechanisms.85 Discussed
in detail later in this Comment, IIAs are typically comprised of the following
eight topics: (1) scope of application; (2) conditions for the entry of foreign
investment; (3) general standards of treatment of foreign investments; (4)
monetary transfers; (5) operational conditions of the investment; (6) protection
against expropriation and dispossession; (7) compensation for losses; and (8)
investment dispute settlement, including transparency, external party
involvement, and considerations for any new multilateral frameworks.86 While
each of these eight provisions found in IIAs will be instrumental to finalizing
the TTIP, this Comment will first focus on the history of U.S. and EU IIAs and
their starting-point IIA texts, the current status of TTIP negotiations, and the
analysis of specific TTIP ISDS provisions to determine possible reconciliation
in the context of the proposed U.S.-EU TTIP.
II. U.S. & EU IIA BACKGROUND, MODEL TEXT HISTORY, AND IMPACT ON
MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENT DISCUSSIONS
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) requires members of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) to notify the WTO of any preferential
trade agreements, mostly FTAs, or, in rare circumstances, customs unions.87
As of 2008, the 200 active agreements recognized by the WTO as being in
force show how the U.S. and EU have become the preeminent leaders in
instituting and signing the majority of international trade agreements.88 In this
context, an examination of U.S. and EU history regarding IIAs and the recent
developments of model IIA texts will set the stage for how the TTIP will
further strengthen the U.S. and EU as global leaders in international investment
law.

85

Gudgeon, supra note 40, at 112.
Id. at 79.
87 H. Horn, P.C. Mavroidis, & A. Sapir, Beyond the WTO? An anatomy of EU and US preferential trade
agreements, 33 WORLD ECON. 1, 2 (2009).
88 Id.
86
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A. U.S. IIA Background & Model Text History
1. U.S. IIA Background
The first U.S. IIAs were known as Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation (FCNs).89 The U.S. State Department saw the positive effect
Europe had with more modern IIAs because these only considered “essential
investment-related subjects such as treatment standards, expropriation,
financial transfers, and dispute settlement.”90 Consequently, the U.S.
government began considering modern IIAs in the mid-1970s after a chain of
developing nations expropriated U.S. investments.91
The first U.S. modern IIAs were negotiated in the 1980s, with the U.S.
concluding its first treaties with Panama in 1982, Senegal in 1983, Congo
(formerly Zaire) in 1984, and Morocco in 1985.92 In 1992, the U.S. concluded
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)93 with Canada and
Mexico, greatly influencing future U.S. IIA investment chapters.94 While early
U.S. IIAs were focused mainly on the protection of U.S. investments, NAFTA
was the first time the U.S. obligated itself to protect the investments of another
capital-exporting state and consented to jurisdiction in front of an international
arbitration tribunal against foreign investors.95
2. U.S. Model BIT Text
The U.S. obligations under NAFTA resulted in a negative reaction by U.S.
citizens after realizing the U.S. government could be held liable to foreign
investors.96 As a result, the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Office of the
Trade Representative began redrafting the Model U.S. BIT, a program that
began in the early 1980s and was last reworked for NAFTA.97 In 2004, the
89 Gudgeon, supra note 40, at 107–08. While some of these preliminary stage IIAs are still in effect in
over 50 countries, the programs used to negotiate these agreements were largely unsuccessful with developing
countries. Id. at 108.
90 Id. at 109.
91 Id. at 110.
92 See United States Bilateral Investment Treaties, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/
bit/117402.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
93 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
94 Cross, supra note 7, at 192–93.
95 Id. at 166.
96 Id. at 176.
97 John R. Crook, United States Adopts New Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 662,
662 (2012).
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U.S. adopted its 2004 Model BIT text based on previous IIA investment
chapters98 and debates in Congress over globalization and free trade issues.99
U.S. trade policy moving forward was highlighted by Senate Finance
Committee Chairman Max Baucus, who argued IIAs “achieve a balance
between protecting U.S. investors abroad and defending the regulatory
authority of the United States.”100
In 2009, the Obama administration halted all ongoing negotiations for IIAs
and created a subcommittee to review the 2004 Model BIT text.101 This review
was done to ensure the current U.S. Model BIT adequately represented the
public interest, the Obama administration’s economic plan, and the global
economic developments occurring after the drafting of the 2004 Model BIT.102
After a three-year process, the U.S. State Department released the 2012 Model
BIT text103 as a starting point for present IIA agreement negotiations.104 The
2012 Model BIT (“U.S. Model”) text changed provisions regarding stateowned enterprises (“SOEs”), performance mandates, environmental and labor
welfare, financial services, transparency, standards for third-party stakeholder
involvement, and potential ISDS framework changes.105
Significantly, while the U.S. Model continues to ensure strong protection
for U.S. investors, there were three important provision changes in the 2012
U.S. Model text.106 First, transparency provisions were updated to require both
the U.S. and other parties in future IIA agreements with the U.S. “to consult
periodically regarding how to improve their transparency practices, both in the
context of developing and implementing laws, regulations, and other measures
98

Lo, supra note 7, at 154.
Cross, supra note 7, at 179.
100 Id. at 182. This shift in U.S. investment treaty policy also highlighted several negotiation objectives
that are still central to U.S. IIA negotiations, such as creating standards for the fair treatment of expropriation,
improving investor-state arbitration procedures, and promoting further transparency in arbitration proceedings.
19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3) (2002).
101 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: Fact Sheet (Apr. 20, 2012),
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/188199.htm.
102 Id.; AKHTAR & WEISS, supra note 8, at 10.
103 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (2012), available at http://www.
state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/index.htm [hereinafter U.S. Model].
104 The U.S. State Department aimed the new draft at continuing the goals of the 2004 Model BIT text “to
provide strong investor protections and preserve the government’s ability to regulate in the public interest.”
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, United States Concludes Review of Model Bilateral Investment Treaty
(Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/04/188198.htm.
105 AKHTAR & WEISS, supra note 8, at 10–11 (including a brief synopsis of all changes made regarding
these provisions).
106 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 104.
99
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affecting investment and in the context of investor-State dispute settlement.”107
Second, the updated text strengthens each party’s requirements to publish
proposed regulatory legislation along with explanations and to answer any
applicable comments from interested parties.108 Third, the U.S. Model updated
provisions mandating that any “future multilateral appellate procedures . . .
includes provisions on transparency and public participation” on equal terms to
what parties already provided for in the ISDS provisions of their IIA.109 These
changes, along with the rest of the U.S. Model, form the starting point for U.S.
TTIP negotiations on ISDS provisions.
The U.S. approached the TTIP by stating that the agreement “would
include ambitious reciprocal market opening in goods, services, and
investment, and would offer additional opportunities for modernizing trade
rules and identifying new means of reducing the non-tariff barriers that now
constitute the most significant obstacle to increased transatlantic trade.”110 The
statement went on to highlight potential business and employment prospects
while providing an expansion of both “trade and investment opportunities” for
the U.S. and the EU.111
B. EU IIA Background & Model Text History
1. EU IIA Background
The European Community, created through the European Economic
Community Treaty in 1957,112 is a complex legal system involving a balance
between member states’ national sovereignty and a supranational legal

107

AKHTAR & WEISS, supra note 8, at 11.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 101.
109 Id.
110 The President’s 2013 Trade Policy Agenda: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 113th Cong. 3
(2013) (statement of Ambassador Demetrios Marantis, Acting United States Trade Rep.).
111 Id. “In the TPP and TTIP negotiations, for example, the United States is seeking new disciplines to
address trade distortions and unfair competition associated with the increasing engagement of large, Stateowned enterprises in international trade. The Administration is also actively combating ‘localization barriers to
trade’–i.e., measures designed to protect, favor, or stimulate domestic industries, service providers, and/or
intellectual property (IP) at the expense of goods, services, or IP from other countries. Localization barriers to
trade have increased in the last few years, especially in some of the world’s largest and fastest growing
markets.” Id. at 4.
112 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
108
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system.113 After 1957, member states were still free to enter into IIAs with
other states. Then, in 1994, the European Union was formally created with the
Treaty on European Union.114 The Treaty on European Union is based on a
system in which Member States retain all rights and competencies not
conferred to the European Union, so as to protect national identity and
territoriality, and the right of Member States to self-govern.115
With the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009,116 EU Member States
conferred exclusive competence of foreign direct investment from the EU
Member States to the EU, while retaining collective competence over IIAs.117
When the EU gained control over foreign direct investment, IIAs signed by EU
Member States were not automatically terminated.118 There is some ambiguity
as to whether the EU will force Member States to agree to terminate any
individual IIA with the U.S. before a U.S.-EU agreement may be signed,119
because the EU does not have any formal international dispute settlement
provision similar to that found in IIAs.120 Additionally, any IIAs finalized by
113 Anderer, supra note 20, at 861. For a full background on the interplay between various authoritative
EU decision-making bodies and their jurisdiction, see Youri Devuyst, European Union Law and Practice in
the Negotiation and Conclusion of International Trade Agreements, 12 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 259 (2013).
114 Treaty on European Union (EU), Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 1 [hereinafter Treaty on EU].
115 Id.; see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012/C 326/01,
art. 4 & 5, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL:EN:
PDF (highlighting that these provisions are still paramount, even after the Lisbon Treaty went into effect
(discussed later)). With this treaty, Member States controlled treaty powers, but provided the European Union
an ability to control foreign investments, and to conclude agreements with developing countries. Treaty on EU,
supra note 114, art. 43, 48–60. However, this treaty did not provide exclusive rights to the EU to control
foreign investment or finalize IIAs. Id. art. 181. Much of the interplay between Member States and the EU was
based upon the three types of competencies: competencies held exclusively by the EU, competencies
collectively controlled by both the EU and EU Member States, and competencies held exclusively by Member
States but providing the EU an ability to support, coordinate or supplement those states’ actions. Derrick Wyatt
& Alan Ashwood, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 91–97 (5th ed. 2006). Those rights were still within the jurisdiction
of EU Member States. Id.
116 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European
Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.
117 Anderer, supra note 20, at 873; see also Stephen Woolcock, The Potential Impact of the Lisbon Treaty
on European Union External Trade Policy, 8 SWEDISH INST. EUR. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 1 (2008).
118 Anderer, supra note 20, at 877. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty is only
terminated one of two ways. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, part V, Jan. 27, 1980, 115 U.N.T.S
331. First, a treaty may be terminated according to its own terms. Id. art. 42. Second, if all parties to the old
treaty conclude a new treaty regarding the same subject matter and establish that all parties shall instead be
governed by the new treaty, or if the old treaty provisions are too incompatible with the new treaty that the old
treaty cannot be applied. Id. art. 59.
119 Anderer, supra note 20, at 868–69.
120 Id. at 880. Until the EU finalizes any agreement, foreign investors need to rely on bringing claims
against the EU in the European Court of Justice. Id.; see Lorenza Mola, Which Role for the EU in the
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the EU are binding on Member States, with the possibility of state violations
being brought by the EU in the European Court of Justice.121 Finally, before
the EU begins IIA negotiations, the Council of Ministers may provide
guidelines and general objectives for the European Commission to be used
during the negotiations,122 even though this is not legally binding on the
European Commission.123 The European Commission received the official
mandate to begin negotiations with the U.S. regarding the TTIP on June 14,
2013.124
2. EU IIA Draft Text
Due to the new legal framework of the Lisbon Treaty in which FDI became
an exclusive competence of the European Union, heated debates ensued
between the European Commission, European Council of Ministers, and the
European Parliament about the initial negotiating positions for future EU
IIAs.125 In May 2012, the Directorate-General for Trade of the European
Commission distributed to Member States a non-public first draft of ISDS
provisions for EU investment treaties with the aim of receiving comments.126
In June, a public draft text (“EU Draft”) was released that addresses the
following issues: transparency, tribunal creation, enforcement of arbitration
awards, and potential future appellate mechanisms.127
First, the EU Draft improves transparency measures by requiring, with the
exception of protected information, that a wider amount of arbitration

Development of International Investment Law? (Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law, working paper No. 26/8, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1154583.
121 Devuyst, supra note 113, at 273 (citing Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, art. 216(2)).
122 Devuyst, supra note 113, at 290.
123 Id.
124 Press Release, European Comm’n, Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Commissioner
Karel De Gucht welcomes Member States’ green light to start negotiations (June 14, 2013), available at http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=917.
125 Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Analysis of the European Commission’s Draft Text on InvestorState Dispute Settlement for EU Agreements, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (July 19, 2012), available at
www.iisd.org/itn/2012/07/19/analysis-of-the-european-commissions-draft-text-on-investor-state-disputesettlement-for-eu-agreements/.
126 Id. See also Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
Establishing a Framework for Managing Financial Responsibility Linked to Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Tribunals Established by International Agreements to which the European Union is Party, COM (2012) 335
final (May 6, 2012) [hereinafter EU Draft].
127 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 125.
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documents be made public.128 These public documents include accepted
submissions by the public and other interested third parties.129 Second, the EU
Draft creates a more static field of potential arbitrators to international
investment disputes.130 The provisions specify each party to the IIA creates a
list of at least five arbitrators chosen by the country, and five arbitrators “who
are not nationals of either Party to act as chairperson of the tribunals.”131 With
all countries party to an IIA with the EU adhering to this requirement, all
contracting parties to any future EU IIA should have clarity about which
arbitrators could be appointed.132 Third, the EU Draft states that enforcement
of international arbitration awards within a territory should occur as if the
judgments were those of the territory’s highest court.133 Fourth, the EU Draft
establishes a Committee for the Settlement of Investor-State Disputes tasked
with interpreting current ISDS issues and researching the possibility of a future
international arbitration appellate mechanism.134
In addition to the previously discussed EU Draft, the European
Commission’s Trade Policy Committee released initial negotiating objectives
for the TTIP (“EU Directive”) in June 2013 in a private correspondence with
Member States in anticipation of the proposed U.S.-EU TTIP negotiations.135

128 Id. Some member states have expressed a desire to balance public availability of documents with
investor privacy rights; however, the EU Draft’s stated concern for legitimacy and governance for international
arbitration mandates expansive transparency measures in all future EU IIAs. Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. Qualified arbitrators are required in the EU Draft to possess the following standards: (1) special
knowledge of international public and private law; (2) independence from any organization, government, or
disputing party; and (3) compliance with an agreed upon code of conduct, of which the EU offers the
International Bar Association’s Guidelines on Conflicts of Interests in International Arbitration which
“contains unequivocal language requiring arbitrators to be impartial, independent and free of any conflict of
interest.” Id. See also INT’L BAR ASS’N [IBA], GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION, (May 22, 2004), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=e2
fe5e72-eb14-4bba-b10d-d33dafee8918. (approved May 22, 2004), available at http://www.ibanet.org/
Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=e2fe5e72-eb14-4bba-b10d-d33dafee8918.
132 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 125.
133 Id. This is a marked change from ICSID Convention standards, which allow for award annulment
proceedings in limited cases. Id. Alternatively, any non-ICSID arbitration would fall under the New York
Convention framework which specifies that, without any problems with arbitration procedures (tribunal
makeup or behavior), awards beyond the scope of arbitration, or matters of public policy, any international
arbitration award are enforceable in any other contracting state. Id.; see infra Part I.B.1.
134 Bernasconi-Osterwalder, supra note 125.
135 Initial Position Paper of the Trade Policy Committee on Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP), COM (2013) 238/13 (June 20, 2013), at 3 available at http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/
tpc-ttip-non-papers-for-1st-round-negotiatons-june20-2013.pdf.
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Revised initial negotiating positions were leaked to the press136 in June by the
Irish Presidency, after revisions from France and other EU Member States.137
The EU Directive describes starting positions concerning investor treatment,
investment protection, ISDS enforcement, trade policy, and financial
services.138
First, the EU Directive takes a unique stand on investor treatment by
explicitly declaring any investor shall receive treatment no less favorable in
host states than any of the host state’s investors or companies, but inserts a
clause that treatment should take into “account of the sensitive nature of
certain specific sectors.”139 Second, the EU Directive has a strong stance on
investment protection stating the EU objective of the TTIP should “provide for
the highest possible level of legal protection and certainty for European
investors in the US” and ensure a fair and equal opportunity for investors in
both the U.S. and the EU.140 Third, ISDS enforcement concerns include
transparency, arbitrator independence, predictability, binding awards, and noninterference of state-to-state disputes with investor-state dispute settlement,141
while also pushing for provisions punishing frivolous claims.142
Fourth, the EU Directive seeks to include provisions concerning how state
monopolies, state owned enterprises, and other entities are granted unique

136 EU-US FTA (TTIP) - EU initial position papers, Revision 2 (2013), available at http://blogs.r.ftdata.
co.uk/brusselsblog/files/2013/06/TTIP-Rev-2-Mandate.pdf [hereinafter Revision 2].
137 Peter Spiegel, France, films & foreign trade: the leaked mandate, FINANCIAL TIMES, BRUSSELS BLOG
(June 10, 2013, 7:02 PM), http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2013/06/france-films-foreign-trade-the-leakedmandate/. See also General Secretariat of the Council Directives for the Negotiation on the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the United States of America, COM
(2013) (June 17, 2013), at 2 available at https://www.laquadrature.net/files/TAFTA%20_%20Mandate%20_
%2020130617.pdf [hereinafter EU Directive].
138 Revision 2, supra note 136, ¶ 22.
139 Id. ¶16. See also EU Directive, supra note 137. There is a strong sentiment of Member States that any
ISDS provisions not construe any cultural protections to certain industries as a violation of the investment
agreement. Spiegel, supra note 137. As one example, France requires that any U.S-EU IIA not interfere with
cultural subsidies to protect the French audiovisual industry (movies and/or music). See id.; Revision 2, supra
note 136.
140 Revision 2, supra note 136. See EU Directive, supra note 137. The EU position on investment
protection is also important because it seeks to force agreement that the EU and its Member States retain the
rights “to pursue legitimate public policy objectives . . . in a non-discriminatory manner” and that the TTIP
should defer to EU and Member States policies regarding cultural diversity. Id.
141 Revision 2, supra note 136.
142 Id.
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market rights.143 Fifth, the EU Directive discusses the free movement of capital
and financial services between the U.S-EU.144 Finally, the EU Directive urges
negotiators to fully consider the creation of a U.S.-EU investment arbitration
“appellate mechanism” to review awards in light of “ISDS and domestic
remedies.”145
After considering the background of the U.S. and EU IIAs and the positions
of each regarding IIA ISDS draft texts, this Comment will now briefly examine
global implications that a reconciled TTIP could have on any future
multilateral investment agreement. Then, Part III will discuss general IIA
provisions. Part IV will consider ongoing backlash towards the TTIP and why
the U.S. and EU will likely still execute the TTIP. Then, Part V will analyze
specific ISDS provisions in the potential TTIP with reconciliatory positions.
C. Potential Global Implications of the TTIP: A Future Multilateral
Agreement on Investment
As will be shown, the U.S. and EU express a public desire to work together
to enact similar ISDS provisions from the proposed TTIP in future IIAs with
other countries, both developed and developing.146 These shared objectives
between the U.S. and EU highlight key ideas such as “including a commitment
to open and non-discriminatory investment policies, a level competitive
playing field, strong protections for investors and their investments, neutral
and binding international dispute settlement, strong rules on transparency and
public participation, responsible business conduct, and narrowly-tailored
reviews of national security considerations.”147 This idea of promoting an MAI
beneficial to both the U.S. and EU goes back to the Transatlantic Agenda, in
which both sides “will work together for the successful conclusion of a

143 Id. See EU Directive, supra note 137. Furthering this idea, the document also wishes to find U.S.-EU
agreement on an open, “unrestricted and sustainable access to raw materials” and energy. Revision 2, supra
note 136.
144 Id. The EU seeks to include clauses allowing the complete liberalization of both “current payments and
capital movements,” showing a desire to eliminate any restrictions on monetary transfers between foreign
investors and their home states as a result of the TTIP. Id.
145 Id.
146 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, United States, European Union Reaffirm Commitment to Open,
Transparent, and Non-Discriminatory Investment Policies (Apr. 10, 2012) [hereinafter Investment Policies].
147 Id.
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Multilateral Agreement on Investment . . . that espouses strong principles on
international investment liberalisation and protection.”148
The concept of the multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) first
appeared in the 1960s; however, in 1995, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) again attempted to negotiate a MAI to
adopt a global standard on international foreign investment.149 This agreement
failed for two reasons.150 First, initial MAI negotiations only included
developed states creating a document “more protective of foreign investment”
than IIAs, with developing states having little ability to influence final
parameters.151 Second, certain negotiating parties were unwilling to slacken
investment liberalization with regards to specific national industries.152 Failing
to find agreement, the OECD declared the MAI dead in 1998.153 In some
respects, the prevalence of IIAs also contributed to the 1998 MAI failure, as an
MAI would need to afford investor protections at least as strong as IIAs
currently in place.154 Though the WTO established a working group in the late
1990s to discuss a different version of a MAI,155 the WTO stopped another
attempt to create a multilateral investment agreement in 2004.156
However, it is beyond the scope of this Comment whether the TTIP would
actually change the notion that an MAI is possible on a global scale.157 The
conclusion of the potential TTIP begs two questions. As most states already
have IIAs with either or both the U.S. and EU, would a multilateral investment
agreement based on a reconciled draft of a U.S. and EU IIA become the modus
operandi moving forward? Assuming the TTIP has strong foreign investor
protections, reduced transaction costs, and incorporates up to forty percent of

148 The New Transatlantic Agenda, 1995 US-EU Summit in Madrid (Dec. 5, 1995), available at http://
eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/new_transatlantic_agenda_en.pdf.
149 Bubb & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 58, at 297. These agreements served as the basis for early
European BITs. Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 298.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 309.
155 Id. at 298.
156 Timothy Meyer, Codifying Custom, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 997 (2012).
157 An improvement to the global economy could occur as a future MAI “would produce larger aggregate
benefits from investment than any set of bilateral agreements because providing a single uniform multilateral
regime reduces the transaction costs of foreign investment” and would ensure that trade partners with no IIA in
effect would have legal protection over their domestic investor’s FDI. Bubb & Rose-Ackerman, supra note 58,
at 307–08.
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global economic output, how many other states will be encouraged to agree to
similar provisions, creating a true “de facto MAI” for international investment
protection standards?158 After discussing implications for the U.S.-EU
economies and potential impacts on a global scale, this Comment will now
discuss general IIA provisions before looking at U.S.-EU public backlash and
how actual model IIA ISDS provisions from both sides can be reconciled in the
TTIP.
III. GENERAL IIA PROVISIONS
The first time a U.S.-EU IIA was discussed was in 1995,159 however, “it
took the rise of China, the death of world trade talks and the havoc of the
global financial crisis” to push leaders together for the current negotiations.160
Preparations for the current round of negotiations began in 2011.161 Mike
Froman, U.S. Trade Representative, said the U.S. went into “these negotiations
with the goal of achieving the broadest possible, most comprehensive
agreement” with the EU.162 Important to TTIP provision negotiation, the U.S.
typically chooses a legal “functionalist” approach by including fewer
provisions but stronger legal enforceability.163 However, the EU favors “legal
inflation” with the inclusion of more provisions but only having strong legal
enforcement on few of the provisions.164
The proposed U.S.-EU IIA is important because a great economic impact
on both the U.S and EU, and far-reaching regulatory effects on both parties are
likely. The proposed agreement would become the largest IIA in the world by
encompassing about 50% of the world’s economic output, 30% of world trade,
and 20% of global FDI.165 Trade between the U.S. and EU accounted for more
than $645 billion in 2012.166 Also, the Centre for Economic Policy Research
(CEPR) estimates the removal of U.S.-EU tariffs and the reduction of
regulations could increase economic growth between the U.S. and EU by more

158 See generally Dr. Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto
Multilateral Agreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 303 (2009).
159 Palmer, supra note 3.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Mavroidis, supra note 87, at 1565–88.
164 Id.
165 See Palmer, supra note 3, at 1.
166 Id.
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than $100 billion per year.167 Both the U.S. and the EU aim to finalize the
TTIP in 2014.168
With the potential for trade growth between the U.S. and the EU, it
logically follows that there could be many more investment disputes. The
investment provisions will likely be a cornerstone of the TTIP. With this in
mind, this Comment now examines eight key investment provisions in the U.S.
Model and the EU Draft for the TTIP: (1) scope of application; (2) conditions
for the entry of foreign investment; (3) general standards of treatment of
foreign investments; (4) monetary transfers; (5) operational conditions of the
investment; (6) protection against expropriation and dispossession; (7)
compensation for losses; and (8) investment dispute settlement.169 The first
seven topics will briefly be discussed as to their relevance in IIAs before Part
IV analyzes specific provisions and reconciliation of the investment dispute
settlement sections for both the U.S. and the EU.
A. Scope of Application
The scope of application specifically outlines which investors and
investments are under the jurisdiction of the treaty.170 These limitations
typically are found clearly defined near the beginning of an IIA agreement
under sections labeled such as “investors,” “companies,” “nationals,”
“investments,” “territory,” etc.171 The majority of IIAs consider four basic
elements of jurisdiction covered by an IIA: “(1) the form of the investment; (2)
the area of the investment’s economic activity; (3) the time when the
investment is made; and (4) the investor’s connection with the other
contracting state.”172

167

Id.
Gary Shapiro, The Global Economy Is Counting On A U.S./Europe Trade Deal, FORBES (Aug. 13,
2013),
www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/08/13/the-global-economy-is-counting-on-a-u-s-europe-tradedeal/.
169 See Part I.C.4.
170 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 10, at 80.
171 Id.
172 Id. The form of investment in most IIAs typically comprises both tangible and intangible property. Id.
While IIAs of both the U.S. and EU typically provide protection to currently operating investments, there tends
to be broad definitions in all IIAs of the terms “investor” and “investment” as countries seek an allencompassing lexicon. Id. Moreover, most IIAs provide investors a certain time period, usually between 15
and 20 years, in which investor protections are still valid when the investment began under the expectation of
treaty protection. Id. at 81.
168
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An important aspect in defining the scope of application is the decision as
to which investors are protected by the treaty.173 For individuals, IIAs almost
always use a test of citizenship or nationality.174 For an investor’s dispute to
fall under an IIA, the agreement will explicitly define jurisdiction.175
B. Conditions of Entry
A second important part of IIAs are conditions of entry.176 Conditions of
entry provide investors the right to enter the host state and tend to promote
investments and provide operation of the investment, rather than focusing on
investment protection.177
C. General Standards of Treatment of Foreign Investments
Third, with regard to general standards of treatment of foreign investments,
“[t]he totality of obligations that a host country owes a foreign investor or
investment after the investment is made” is referred to in IIAs as the treatment
owed to an investor or its investment.178 These provisions typically are divided
between general provisions affecting all foreign investors and specific
provisions affecting particular matters discussed by the parties.179 The general
provisions typically fall under six categories, outlined by Salacuse and Sullivan
as: “(1) fair and equitable treatment; (2) the provision of full protection and
security; (3) protection from unreasonable or discriminatory measures; (4)
treatment no less than that accorded by international law; (5) requirement to
respect obligations made to investors and investments; and (6) national and/or
most-favored-nation treatment.”180

173 Id. For example, the U.S. individually defines FDI as “the ownership or control, directly or indirectly,
by one foreign person of 10 per centum or more of the voting securities of an incorporated U.S. business
enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated U.S. business enterprise, including a branch.” Foreign
Direct Investment, 15 C.F.R. § 806.15 (2009).
174 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 10, at 81.
175 Id. at 82. Jurisdiction is based on: “(1) country of the company’s incorporation, (2) country of the
company’s seat, registered office, or principal place of business, or (3) country whose nationals have control
over, or a substantial interest in, the company making the investment.” Id. (noting that some IIAs also require
companies to meet at least two of these requirements).
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 83.
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Fair and equitable treatment is defined by both IIAs and customary
international law, but typically concerns the obligation of the host country to
treat FDI fairly and equitably.181 A host state is also obligated to provide “full
protection and security” to FDI.182 Additionally, many IIAs bind contracting
parties to not “impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures the
management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of an investment.”183
Further, many IIAs provide that in no case should foreign investments be given
less favorable treatment than that required by international law.184
Important to negotiations, countries formalize the law governing disputes,
as opposed to relying on customary law, so as to not have any ambiguity about
which law governs the agreement.185 Also, many IIAs require that a signatory
state respect contractual obligations in accord with the binding agreement.186
Finally, many IIAs include provisions for “most-favored-nation treatment”
(MFN) that requires “a host country treat an investor or an investment, once
made, no less favorably than they treat their own national investors or
investments made by their own nationals.”187
D. Monetary Transfers
Additionally, capital-exporting states seek unrestricted freedom for their
investors to conduct monetary transfers between the host state and home state–
an activity referred to as “transfers.”188 Foreign direct investment requires the
ability to transfer income and capital between the home state and host state to
meet financial obligations in other currencies, to acquire resources and to

181 Id. (citing U.N. Ctr. On Transnational Corp. (“UNCTC”), Bilateral Investment Treaties 41–45, U.N.
Doc. ST/CTC/65 (1988) for more in-depth analysis.).
182 Id. While the host state is not liable for all acts against FDI, the host state typically is liable for any
lack of due diligence. Id.
183 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 10, at 84 (quoting TREATY CONCERNING THE RECIPROCAL
ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENTS, U.S.-Turk., art. 2(3) Dec. 3, 1985, available at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/43615.pdf (last visited July 28, 2014)). Although, the term
“unreasonable” provides grounds for argument between an investor and host state. Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. This can create a situation in which a host state directly contracts with a foreign investor, but must
use the dispute resolution in the IIA instead of pursuing any claims using agreed upon international law within
the IIA instead of the host state’s domestic law. Id.
187 Id. at 84–85. This is important because there is no uniform customary international law requiring a
nation to give foreign investors operating within their territory equal protection under their laws as domestic
investors, due to the split between the Hull Rule and the Calvo Doctrine.
188 Id. at 85.
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maintain operations.189 However, IIAs almost always conclude after dealing
with five attributes of transfers: “(1) the general nature of the investor’s rights
to make monetary transfers; (2) the types of payments that are covered by the
right to make transfers; (3) the currency with which the payment may be made;
(4) the applicable exchange rate; and (5) the time within which the host
country must allow the investor to make transfers.”190
E. Operational Conditions of the Investment
IIAs also include provisions outlining the operational rights provided to
investors, such as entering the host country “to manage and operate the
investment.”191 Interestingly, most IIAs do not afford investors an automatic
right-of-entry into host states.192
F. Protection Against Expropriation and Dispossession
Furthermore, IIAs seek to protect foreign investors from host state
expropriation and dispossession.193 Almost all IIAs dictate “a state may not
expropriate property of an alien except: (1) for a public purpose, (2) in a nondiscriminatory manner, (3) upon payment of just compensation, and in most
instances, (4) with provision for some form of judicial review.”194
G. Compensation for Losses
Compensation for investor losses due to host state causes are another main
part of IIAs. Most IIAs include provisions granting compensation rights to
investors due to losses when a host state has armed conflict or internal
chaos.195 However, this right to compensation is not absolute and may only
provide investors the same remedy available to a host state’s domestic
investors.196

189

Id. These negotiations normally are quite difficult to arrange when parties to an IIA include a
developing and a developed state. Id. at 85–86.
190 Id. at 85.
191 Id. at 86 (also citing “the investor’s right to enter the country, employ foreign nationals, and be free of
performance requirements” as additional aspects of negotiation).
192 Id.
193 Id. at 86–87. See also infra Part I.B.2. As such, most IIAs now prescribe use of the Hull Rule. Id. at 87.
For a more complete background of the Hull Rule and the Calvo Doctrine, see infra Part I.C.1.
194 Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 10, at 87.
195 Id. at 86.
196 Id.
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IV. PUBLIC BACKLASH AND POTENTIAL POLITICAL AMENABILITY
A. Backlash
Even with all of the purported economic benefits of an executed IIA,
various stakeholders hoist considerable backlash against specific provisions of
the proposed TTIP. In December 2013, a consortium of more than 100 citizen
protection groups, non-government organizations, and other critics signed an
open letter (“Open Letter”) seeking to exclude ISDS provisions from the
TTIP.197 This and other rising public pressure in Europe led to a January 21,
2014 announcement by the European Commission to halt certain talks with the
U.S. over the TTIP until it concludes a public consultation about how to deal
with ISDS concerns.198
The Open Letter highlights many public concerns regarding ISDS
provisions.199 First, civil organizations are concerned with foreign companies
being able to sue host governments over disputes created when governments
enact policies aimed at public policy and environmental protection goals.200
Second, the Open Letter has issue with these provisions because they require a
host government compensate foreign companies as a result of any lost profit or
investment money due to any host government’s enacted legislation, including
a desire to protect its citizens.201 Third, the Open Letter highlights issues with a
foreign company being able to lobby and challenge host state policies as a
result of ISDS provisions.202 Finally, this document concludes by asking both
the U.S. and the EU to “exclude Investor-state dispute Settlement” from the
TTIP and including a list of all organizations signing the letter.203
This Open Letter and additional public outcry led to a decision on January
21, 2014 by the European Commission to temporarily freeze all talks over the
investment section of the TTIP until a public consultation is completed.204
However, the European Commission publicly stated that negotiations over
197

Open letter of civil society against investor privileges in TTIP, BILATERS.ORG (Dec. 16, 2013),
available at http://www.bilaterals.org/?open-letter-of-civil-society [hereinafter Open Letter].
198 EU Says It Will Hit ‘Pause’ on TTIP Investment Talks Pending Public Debate, INSIDE U.S. TRADE
(Jan. 21, 2014), available at http://insidetrade.com/201401212458789/WTO-Daily-News/Daily-News/eu-saysit-will-hit-pause-on-ttip-investment-talks-pending-public-debate/menu-id-948.html [hereinafter EU Pause].
199 Open Letter, supra note 197.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 See id.
203 Id.
204 EU Pause, supra note 198.

WEAVER GALLEYSPROOFS2

254

12/3/2014 8:59 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

other parts of the TTIP will commence as planned, with the ISDS talks likely
resuming in the summer of 2014.205 The European Commission plans to
release a draft text for review by the public, the European Union Council, and
all Member State trade ministers.206 Karel De Gucht, the EU Trade
Commissioner, explained that the public forum seeks to understand how
Europeans can “strike a balance between protecting EU investors and
upholding governments’ right to regulate in the public interest.”207 De Gucht
concluded by reiterating ISDS provisions were included in the EU Directive as
a section the EU has an authority to negotiate with the U.S. in the TTIP.208
On March 27, 2014, the EU Commission launched a 90-day “public
consultation” into the proposed investor protection and ISDS provisions
currently negotiated in the TTIP discussions.209 The public consultation was
meant to clarify the “misconceptions and even misrepresentations as to the
aims of ISDS within TTIP negotiations.”210 The questionnaire covered twelve
key topics and includes has an open comment section for general comments.211
Finally, a potentially huge shift in TTIP ISDS negotiation transparency
may be approaching. On July 3, 2014, the European Court of Justice released a
judgment,212 recommending to the European Council that it consider, with the
U.S. Treasury Department, making financial messaging data public data.213
This requires the EU Council to provide specific reasons that the information
will not be made publicly available.214 Specifically, the judgment ruled that
“documents related to international activity, which would include TTIP, are
not automatically exempt from EU transparency requirements.”215

205 Id. (stating that the European Commission wishes to conclude the three month public consultation and
review the gathered information before resuming talks with the U.S. over the ISDS portion of the TTIP).
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 See id.
209 Press Release, European Comm’n, European Commission launches public online consultation on
investor protection in TTIP, (Mar. 27, 2014). The online questionnaire is available at http://ec.europa.eu/
yourvoice/ipm/forms/dispatch?form=ISDS.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Case C-350/12 P, Council v. Int’l Veld, 2014 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 2039 (Jul 3, 2014).
213 Id.
214 TTIP documents could be made public after EU court ruling, EURACTIV.COM (July 4, 2014),
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/euro-finance/ttip-documents-could-be-made-public-after-eu-court-ruling303288.
215 Id.
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B. Backlash Versus U.S.-EU Relations
Backlash can pose a threat to either the TTIP or the inclusion of ISDS
provisions within the agreement, because the European Commission views
ISDS provisions within the TTIP as an important foundation for many future
IIAs.216 In contrast to the public forum over ISDS provisions that began on
January 21, 2013, comments from De Gucht asserted there should be a balance
between investor rights and governmental public policy rights.217 This
Comment will now consider a few of the available U.S.-EU documents
released or leaked that point to a desire by both the U.S. and EU to handle
stakeholder concerns and move forward with the TTIP.
The U.S. and the EU have jointly released multiple documents over the
years describing a long held desire for both sides to seek mutual benefits from
their long-standing relationship. The first public declaration of solidarity
between the U.S. and Europe was in November 1990, known as the
Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations (“Declaration”).218 Specifically,
the Declaration held that common goals for the U.S.-Europe relationship
includes encouraging market principles, eliminating protectionism and
furthering the multilateral trading system, and following policy measures
towards a sustainable and stable global economy with low inflation, high levels
of employment, and fair social conditions.219 As a result of these goals, the
Declaration stated that both sides will “support further steps towards
liberalization, transparency, and the implementation of . . . principles
concerning . . . investment.”220
A second public document highlighting cohesion between both the U.S.
and EU was The New Transatlantic Agenda (“Agenda”), released in December
1995.221 The U.S. and EU acknowledged that current global challenges need a
strengthened partnership between the two sides and require “multilateral
216 Id. See also European Commission Faces Serious Debate over TTIP Investment Rules, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE (Oct. 17, 2013), available at http://insidetrade.com/Inside-US-Trade/Inside-U.S.-Trade-10/18/2013/
european-commission-faces-serious-debate-over-ttip-investment-rules/menu-id-710.html.
217 Free trade: EU frets over US investment talks, BBC NEWS (Jan. 22, 2014), available at http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25829604.
218 European Commission, Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations (Nov. 1990), available at http://
eeas.europa.eu/us/docs/trans_declaration_90_en.pdf. At the release of this document, the EU was referred to as
the European Community (EC).
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 European Commission, The New Transatlantic Agenda (Dec. 1995), available at http://eeas.europa.eu/
us/docs/new_transatlantic_agenda_en.pdf.
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efforts towards a more open world system of trade and investment.”222
Specifically, the Agenda declared the U.S. and EU are “determined to create a
New Transatlantic Marketplace, which will expand trade and investment
opportunities and multiply jobs on both sides of the Atlantic.”223 The Agenda
provided an action plan for this result by declaring an agreement between the
U.S. and EU will be created to minimize or remove barriers between both sides
in the flow of goods and capital.224 The Agenda continued by highlighting that
this agreement will not be possible without an agreement rife with regulatory
cooperation.225
A third document, the Transatlantic Economic Partnership (“Partnership”),
was released in May 1998.226 This Partnership outlines specific sectors and
negotiating points that the U.S and EU agree on promoting globally.227
More than a decade after the Partnership was released, the U.S. and EU
distributed an important new document, the Shared Principles for International
Investment (“Shared Principles”), on April 20, 2012, publicly stating intentions
to continue their historic relationship with an agreement on all provisions of
the TTIP.228 The Shared Principles highlight key areas in which the U.S. and
the EU agree that “creating and maintaining open and stable investment
climates and policies” is equally important to “governments . . . not [seeking]
to attract foreign investment by weakening or failing to apply” appropriate
public interest regulations.229 This brief document is a prime example of how
ISDS provisions play an important role in the development of international
investments and why the U.S. and EU seek to employ these standards in the
TTIP and future IIAs globally.230 Importantly, there is no distinction in the

222

Id.
Id. The Agenda also describes goals of reduced international crime, increased environmental
protection, and increased cooperation in maintaining world peace. Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 European Commission, Transatlantic Economic Partnership (May 1998), available at http://eeas.
europa.eu/us/docs/trans_econ_partner_11_98_en.pdf.
227 Id.
228 Transatlantic Economic Council, Statement of the European Union and the United States on Shared
Principles for International Investment, (Apr. 10, 2012), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2012/april/tradoc_149331.pdf [hereinafter Shared Principles]. See also Investment Policies, supra note 146;
Press Release, European Comm’n, Enterprise and Industry, EU and US adopt blueprint for open and stable
investment climates (Apr. 10, 2012).
229 Shared Principles, supra note 228. See also Investment Policies, supra note 228.
230 See Investment Policies, supra note 228.
223
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language throughout the Shared Principles that places business and economic
concerns over those of the public and environment.231
The Shared Principles names the following seven topics: (1) Open and
Non-Discriminatory Investment Climates; (2) A Level Playing Field; (3)
Strong Protection for Investors and Investments; (4) Fair and Binding Dispute
Settlement; (5) Robust Transparency and Public Participation Rules; (6)
Responsible Business Conduct; and (7) Narrowly-Tailored Reviews of
National Security Considerations.232
First, the Shared Principles emphasizes foreign investors should have broad
market access with investor treatment equal for both domestic and foreign
investors.233 Second, the U.S. and EU governments seek to extend equal
treatment to all entities, state-owned enterprises or private commercial
enterprises.234 Third, all investors should receive “prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation in the event of a direct or indirect expropriation or
nationalization.”235 Fourth, the U.S. and EU are to provide investors access to
investor-state arbitration, while requiring these procedures permit the public
transparency into proceedings and accessibility to participate.236 Fifth, the
Shared Principles point out that transparency concerns should not stop with
arbitration, but rather extend to government transparency regarding the
“development of domestic laws and other measures relating to investment.”237
Sixth, while the Shared Principles are focused on pro-business concerns and
international arbitration, the document urges negotiations must force investors
to act in a socially responsible way.238 Seventh, the Shared Principles state that
any government review of foreign investments should only focus “on genuine
national security risks.”239
Finally, the EU Directive reaffirms that the EU’s objective of the TTIP’s is
to realize “the untapped potential of a truly transatlantic market place,
generating new economic opportunities for the creation of jobs and growth
231

Shared Principles, supra note 228.
Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id. Specifically, the Shared Principles seeks to establish multinational entities that abide by the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. See generally OECD, (2011), OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES, OECD Publishing, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264115415-en.
239 Shared Principles, supra note 228.
232

WEAVER GALLEYSPROOFS2

258

12/3/2014 8:59 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

through increased market access and greater regulatory compatibility and
setting the path for global standards.”240 Further, the EU negotiators were
tasked with finding mutual agreement regarding market access, regulatory
issues and non-tariff barriers, and rules for the purpose of “a single undertaking
ensuring a balanced outcome between the elimination of duties, the elimination
of unnecessary regulatory obstacles to trade and an improvement in rules,
leading to a substantial result in each of these components and effective
opening of each others [sic] markets.”241
With each of these documents, it becomes evident that both sides have a
clear desire to move forward with the TTIP as originally planned. As such, this
Comment’s analysis will hopefully engender more debate about the substance
of the ISDS provisions in the TTIP and provide a springboard for more fruitful
negotiations. Part V of this Comment will now summarize the ISDS provision
analysis and reconciliation of the U.S.-EU TTIP.
V. INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS
The general IIA investor protection provisions discussed in Part III provide
a firm basis for why investment dispute settlement provisions are a
fundamental question concerning all IIAs and their enforceability.242 States
continue to negotiate IIAs as a means to providing dispute resolution
procedures for state-state disputes and investor-state disputes.243 Investor-state
disputes typically dictate first a negotiation among the investors and the host
state with unresolved conflicts going to an international arbitration tribunal,
typically under the rules of the ICSID.244 In addition to the EU Draft, the EU
has publicly stated its desire to release an official public text of the EU
positions on investor protection and ISDS sections of the TTIP.245 The U.S.
240

Revision 2, supra note 136.
EU Directive, supra note 137.
242 Many academics debate whether these provisions, including both ISDS and state-state dispute
settlement, are enforced adequately or provide greater protections to investors or states. Salacuse & Sullivan,
supra note 10, at 87.
243 Id. State-state disputes are typically negotiated diplomatically, but these may go to an ad hoc
arbitration tribunal if the dispute cannot be solved amicably. Id. at 88.
244 Id.
245 Press Release, John Clancy & Helene Banner, Commission to Consult European Public on Provisions
in EU-US Trade Deal on Investment and Investor-State Dispute Settlement (Jan. 21, 2014), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-56_en.htm (stating on January 21, 2014, EU Trade Commissioner
Karel De Gucht “announced his decision to consult the public on the investment provisions. In early March [of
2014], he will publish a proposed EU text for the investment part of the talks which will include sections on
investment protection and on investor-to-state dispute settlement, or ISDS. This draft text will be accompanied
241
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does not want to publicly release any information regarding the closed-door
negotiations. This Comment will now analyze specific provisions regarding
discrepancies between the U.S. Model and the EU Draft documents to examine
differences and offer reconciliation.
A. General Investment Protection Provisions
Investment protection is a large part of deciding which issues the ISDS
provisions will apply. While some definitions spill over in relation to ISDS
provisions, the majority of these concepts have been discussed earlier in the
paper, or, due to brevity, are outside the scope of this Comment. Now, this
Comment will briefly consider the agreement between the U.S. and EU on
investment protection before analyzing specific ISDS provisions.
The scope of the TTIP ISDS provisions will necessarily regulate the
amount of parties and the types of investment covered under the potential
TTIP. The U.S. Model limits the treaty to investors of the other Party and
covered investments.246
Relevant U.S. definitions are as follows:

by clear explanations for the non-expert.”). For obvious reasons, this section could need significant edits upon
any official EU position release on investment protection & ISDS. Author.
246 U.S. Model, supra note 103, art. 2(1).

WEAVER GALLEYSPROOFS2

260

12/3/2014 8:59 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

U.S. Model – Scope Provisions247
“Investor of a “a Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an
Party”
enterprise of a Party, that attempts to make, is making, or
has made an investment in the territory of the other Party;
provided, however, that a natural person who is a dual
national shall be deemed to be exclusively a national of the
State of his or her dominant and effective nationality.”
“Investment”
“every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly
or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an
investment, including such characteristics as the
commitment of capital or other resources, the
expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk.
Forms that an investment may take include:
(a) an enterprise;
(b) shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation
in an enterprise;
(c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans;
(d) futures, options, and other derivatives;
(e) turnkey, construction, management, production,
concession, revenue-sharing, and other similar
contracts;
(f) intellectual property rights;
(g) licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar rights
conferred pursuant to domestic law; and
(h) other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable
property, and related property rights, such as leases,
mortgages, liens, and pledges.
“with respect to a Party, an investment in its territory of an
“Covered
Investment
investor of the other Party in existence as of the date of
entry into force of this Treaty or established, acquired, or
expanded thereafter.”

247

Id. art. 1.
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The EU positions are as follows:
EU Model – Scope Provisions248
“Scope”
“With a view to improving the investment environment,
and in particular the conditions of establishment between
the Parties, this Section applies to measures by the Parties
affecting establishment in all economic activities with the
exception of:
(a) mining, manufacturing and processing of nuclear
materials;
(b) production of, or trade in, arms, munitions and war
material;
(c) audio-visual services;
(d) national maritime cabotage; and
(e) domestic and international air transport services,
whether scheduled or non-scheduled, and services directly
related to the exercise of traffic rights, other than:
(i) aircraft repair and maintenance services;
(ii) the selling and marketing of air transport services;
(iii) CRS services; and
(iv) other services auxiliary to air transport services, such
as ground handling services, rental service of aircraft with
crew and airport management services.”

Both sides take a very expansive definition of investment, with the EU
limiting the scope of any ISDS provisions in a manner that the U.S. would
likely accept.249 As the EU does not make any explicit limitations on when an
economic activity commences, text regarding that section would likely be
negotiated between the sides amicably.
The U.S. also has articles on national treatment,250 most-favored-nation
treatment,251 minimum standard of treatment,252 expropriation and

248 See Free Trade Agreement Between the European Union and its Member States, of the One Part, and
the Republic of Korea, of the Other Part, EU-S. Korea FTA, Oct. 6, 2010, art. 7.10.
249 The U.S. for national-security purposes would likely wish to narrow an agreement that gives up any
U.S. jurisdiction over nuclear materials, war materials, domestic air carriers, or U.S. audio-visual industry
materials.
250 U.S. Model, supra note 103, art. 3.
251 Id. art. 4.
252 Id. art. 5.
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compensation,253 transfers (capital, profits, and payments),254 performance
requirements,255 and transparency (as it relates to laws and proposed
regulations to be adopted by each party, including opportunities for the other
party to participate in the development of those rules and regulations).256 The
EU negotiating parties have been instructed to find agreement in national
treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, minimum standard of treatment
(“fair and equitable treatment”), expropriation and compensation, transfers
(“funds of capital and payment by investors”), performance requirements
(“umbrella clause”), and transparency.257 Due to the formal and informal desire
to find agreement, the sections concerning investment protection should fall
under quick political compromise. Instead, the public pressure mounting in
Europe, as discussed in Part IV, may lead to a narrowing of options available
to the negotiators.258 Notwithstanding the public debate about these provisions,
this Comment will proceed assuming that either the preceding investment
protections will be agreed upon quickly and included in the TTIP or public
debate will render analysis of standard investment provisions moot.
B. Specific ISDS Provisions
The U.S. Model and EU Draft documents provide important provisions
creating the procedure and substance of ISDS, within any proposed IIA. Each
of the following provisions in the potential TTIP will likely be negotiated on
the basis of clarity, fairness, and predictability for the U.S., EU, and each
party’s respective investors. As discussed below, some provisions, such as
consultation, mediation, and third party involvement, are argued in connection
with whether agreement on ISDS will be possible in TTIP negotiations.
However, the U.S. and EU seek broad compromise on other issues of
transparency, arbitrator tribunal composition, and the consideration of creating
an appellate mechanism to govern ISDS arbitration awards.259 Each of these
five issues and proscriptive analysis of reconciliation will now be discussed
before the Comment considers macro-level political issues effecting the
adoption of the TTIP. The following sub-sections will all conclude with a
253

Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 7.
255 Id. art. 8.
256 Id. art. 11.
257 EU Directive, supra note 136, art. 23.
258 See infra Part V.A. for a complete discussion on the public backlash to EU adoption of the TTIP.
259 See infra Part II.A.2. for the U.S. Model discussion and Part II.B.2. for the EU Draft discussion about
these issues.
254
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recommended text that could be used to reconcile the differences between the
U.S. Model and the EU Draft.
1. Consultation/Mediation
Before being able to submit claims for arbitration, both the U.S. and the EU
dictate that both the claimant and respondent seek to amicably resolve their
dispute. The U.S. Model states that both sides should consult with one another
and should consider using a non-binding third party mediator.260 Furthermore,
the U.S. Model requires that a minimum of 90 days pass before a claimant may
submit their claim to arbitration, the claimant must deliver to the respondent a
“notice of intent” including the following: (1) the name, address, and any
entity’s place of incorporation; (2) the alleged breached provision of the IIA;
(3) the legal and factual basis for the claim; and (4) desired relief and estimated
damages.261 If six months have elapsed since the breach of the IIA and 90 days
have elapsed since providing the other party with the “notice of intent,” only
then the claimant may submit the claim to arbitration under their choice of law,
whether that is ICSID Rules, ICSID Additional Facility Rules, UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, or any other mutually agreed upon arbitration rules.262 The
U.S. also requires each party to consent to arbitration in accordance with the
execution of the IIA, and that consent to arbitration is sufficient for both ICSID
and New York Convention rules governing the enforcement of arbitration
awards.263 Finally, the U.S. Model includes a three-year statute of limitations
period in which a claim must be submitted to arbitration.264
The EU Draft requires a claimant provide a “request for consultation” to be
delivered to the respondent, including: (1) the investor’s name and address; (2)
the alleged provision of the IIA breached; (3) the reason provision was
breached; and, (4) the remedy desired and damages.265 The EU Draft requires
four months from the “request for consultation” before the claimant may
submit a claim for arbitration.266 During this time, the EU has a set of rules
governing the procedure of mediation to help both sides understand the process

260

U.S. Model, supra note 103, art. 23.
Id. art. 24(2).
262 Id. art. 24(3).
263 Id. art. 25. See infra Part I.B.1. for a discussion of ICSID and New York Convention rules governing
arbitration award enforcement.
264 U.S. Model, supra note 103, art. 26.
265 EU Draft, supra note 126, art. 2.
266 Id. art. 4.
261
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and hopefully resolve any issue before arbitration.267 If there is no amicable
resolution within three months of submitting the notice of intent to the
respondent, the claimant may then submit the claim to arbitration.268 The EU
Draft also provides the claimant may submit the claim to arbitration under their
choice of law, whether that is ICSID Rules, ICSID Additional Facility Rules,
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, or any other mutually agreed upon arbitration
rules.269 Furthermore, the EU requires each party to consent to arbitration in
accordance with the execution of the IIA, and that consent to arbitration is
sufficient for both ICSID and New York Convention rules governing the
enforcement of arbitration awards.270 Finally, the EU concludes this section by
providing a three-year statute of limitations on when the claimant must begin
the process through a “request for consultation.”271
Both the U.S. and EU already require a claimant provide similar
information to the respondent upon knowledge of the claim. Therefore,
reconciliation of the above provisions would likely require a compromise on
provisions that would lengthen the time before claims are submitted to
arbitration. This would provide for greater time for the claimant and
respondent to resolve the dispute, requiring fewer costly arbitration
proceedings and allowing a mutually agreed upon solution. As such, a claimant
should be required to deliver a “request for consultation” immediately upon
becoming aware of any alleged breach, then provide up to four months to
consult the other side before delivering a “notice of intent” to submit the claim,
and finally there shall be a mandatory three month period before the claim
shall be allowed to be submitted for arbitration. The U.S. does not have a
prescribed set of mediation rules, but already permits a fairly extensive period
of extending litigation in its domestic courts. As such, an edited version of the
EU Draft’s Mediation Mechanism would likely suffice. The statute of
limitations could also be lengthened to provide claimants three years after they
have should become aware of a claim to begin the process mentioned in this
paragraph, as opposed to the U.S. firm deadline. This would provide an even
longer timeline for consultation and mediation. The provisions on arbitration
rules, consent, and enforcement protection are already similar between the U.S.
and EU Drafts, so these provisions would likely not be an issue for negotiators.
267

Id. Annex I.
Id. art. 5.
269 Id.
270 Id. art. 7. See infra Part I.B.1. for a discussion of ICSID and New York Convention rules governing
arbitration award enforcement.
271 Id. art. 2.
268
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A reconciled version of the following relevant sections of this
Consultation/Mediation provision serving both sides could look like the
following:
Consultation/Mediation – Relevant Proposed Reconciled TTIP ISDS
Sections
I.

Request for Consultation.
(A) Both parties should initially seek to resolve any conflicts
amicably.
(B) In the case of an investment dispute, a claiming party shall submit
to the allegedly adverse party a Request for Consultation
(“Request”). The Request shall include:
(1) the name and address of the claimant and, where a claim is
submitted on behalf of an enterprise, the name, address, and
place of incorporation of the enterprise;
(2) the provision of the Agreement allegedly breached for each
claim;
(3) the legal and factual basis for each claim; and
(4) the relief sought and amount of damages claimed.
(C) This process shall include one or more of the following:
consultation, negotiation, or non-binding mediation.
(1) Use of the aforementioned procedures shall not prejudice the
legal rights of either party in any way.
(2) If parties elect to use mediation, the parties shall abide by the
Mediation Mechanism, as attached in Annex A.
(D) No party shall proceed to any below section of this provision until
after 120 days from either submitting or receiving a Request for
Consultation.

II.

Notice of Arbitration.
(A) In the case where an investment dispute is not settled in at least
120 days after the submission of a Request for Consultation, either
party may submit a Notice of Arbitration (“Notice”) to the
following:
(1) the respondent to the claim;
(2) the appropriate arbitration body, as follows:
(a) under ICSID, the Secretary General, as referred to either
under paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the ICSID Convention
or Article 2 of Schedule C of the ICSID Additional
Facility Rules; or
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(b) under UNCITRAL, the respondent as described in Article
3 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
(B) The Notice shall include:
(1) the name and address of the claimant and, where a claim is
submitted on behalf of an enterprise, the name, address, and
place of incorporation of the enterprise;
(2) the provision of the Agreement allegedly breached for each
claim;
(3) the legal and factual basis for each claim; and
(4) the relief sought and amount of damages claimed.
III.

Statute of Limitations.
(A) In the event that a claimant has not submitted a Notice within 18
months of submitting the adverse party a Request, the claimant
shall lose their right to submit a Notice.
(B) At the time a party shall be deemed to have reasonable notice of a
breach of this Agreement, that party shall have only 5 years to
submit a Request to the party allegedly breaching this Agreement.

IV.

Award.
(A) The arbitration tribunal shall specify the exact relief granted
and/or damages awarded.
(B) The tribunal shall not award punitive damages, in that any
monetary or property award shall not be greater than the loss
suffered by a party to this Agreement. However, monetary
damages may include commercially reasonable interest.
(C) The tribunal shall not award reasonable attorney and court costs,
except in the case where one party acts fraudulently or improperly.

IV.

Enforcement Protection.
(A) An award issued pursuant to this Agreement shall be binding on
both disputing parties, and not subject to any appellate
mechanism, except for an appellate mechanism written into this
Agreement or added as an Amendment.
(B) Any judgment awarded through arbitration shall be deemed
enforceable under this Agreement by either:
(1) the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards; or
(2) the ICSID Convention.
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2. Third-party Involvement
In addition to consultation and mediation measures, the U.S. and EU have
similar provisions regarding third-party involvement in the arbitration process.
The U.S. provides two specific provisions governing third-party involvement.
First, a “non-disputing Party may make oral and written submissions to the
tribunal regarding the interpretation of this Treaty.”272 Second, the “tribunal
shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from
a person or entity that is not a disputing party.”273 These broad provisions are
similar to the exact phrasing of the EU Draft. The EU Draft specifically states
that the “arbitral tribunal shall allow a person that is not a disputing party and
not a non-disputing Party to the Agreement . . . to file a written submission
with the arbitral tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute”
when the third-person submits a written document including: (1) the
description of the entity and its “membership and legal status;” (2) disclosure
of any affiliation to either disputing party; (3) information provided by any
government or separate entity assisting in the preparation of their submission;
(4) description of its interest in the arbitration; and (5) specific law or fact in
the arbitration for which they have relevant information.274 With this
information, the EU Draft requires the arbitral tribunal to weigh the prejudice
of the party, significance of the information, and opportunity for disputing
party to rebut evidence into account when allowing the submission.275
The U.S. Model does not narrow the requirements of third-party
submissions, so it will likely accept the requirements set out in the EU Draft.
However, the U.S. may wish to reduce any reliance on the arbitral tribunal to
accept or deny the submissions. As a matter of predictability and transparency,
the U.S. will probably negotiate that any submission meeting the threshold of
significant information be allowed into the proceeding. The arbitral tribunal,
under the EU Draft already has the ability to weigh evidence differently when
making the final judgment.
A reconciled version of the following relevant sections of this Third-party
Involvement provision serving both sides could look like the following:

272
273
274
275

U.S. Model, supra note 103, art. 28(2).
Id. art. 28(3) (italics in original).
EU Draft, supra note 126, Annex III, art. 4.
Id. at Annex III, art. 4(c).
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Third-party Involvement – Relevant Proposed Reconciled TTIP ISDS
Sections
I. Non-disputing Party Submissions.
(A) A non-disputing party may make written amicus curiae
submissions to the arbitration tribunal regarding any interpretation
of this Agreement.
(1) Any submission by a non-disputing party must fall under
[Chapter regarding Scope] of this Agreement.
(2) Submissions to the arbitration tribunal shall be made in the
agreed upon language of the tribunal.
(3) The arbitration tribunal may limit the length of non-disputing
party submissions.
(B) Submissions shall include the following information:
(1) a description of the non-disputing party making the
submission, including its legal status (e.g. NGO, corporate
designation, trade association, etc.), general objectives, nature
of activities, and all parent and subsidiary organizations;
(2) a full disclosure whether or not the non-disputing party has any
affiliation, direct or indirect, with any disputing party;
(3) a full report of all information disclosed within 3 years to the
non-disputing party by any government, person, or
organization providing financial, legal, or other assistance in
preparing the submission; and
(4) the date and signature of the party making the submission to
the arbitration tribunal.
(C) The tribunal shall have the authority to consider or deny
submissions based on the following:
(1) the merit of the submission;
(2) the burden of the submission upon the arbitration tribunal;
(3) the interest of the non-disputing party; and
(4) the extent the submission is relevant to the arbitration tribunal.

3. Transparency
Transparency is a very current issue in ISDS, especially as the public
becomes more concerned with governments paying out large awards to foreign
investors.276 Both the U.S. Model and the EU Draft provides that the “notice of

276

See infra Part II.A.2.
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consultation,” “notice of intent,” “notice of arbitration,” all written documents
(pleadings, briefs, etc., by both disputing parties and third-persons), expert
reports, hearing transcripts, orders, decisions, and awards be made public.277
The U.S. Model and EU Draft also provide mechanisms for disputing parties to
hold private hearings when discussing protected information, per arbitral
tribunal permission.278 Both the U.S. Model and EU Draft provide disputing
parties to submit both original and redacted documents for the arbitral tribunal
to use when distributing information to the public.279
The U.S. Model provides for similar transparency rules to the EU Draft.
However, the U.S. Model is more efficient in the use of redacted materials,
because the U.S. Model requires original and redacted documents to be
submitted to the arbitral tribunal at onset.280 This is a more streamlined
approach to protected information than the EU Draft, which requires a 30 day
period for the arbitral tribunal to determine if a document needs to be redacted
before a party needs to provide a redacted document.281 Transparency issues,
while a problem for international arbitration in the past,282 has been largely
resolved through multilateral efforts.283
A reconciled version of the following relevant sections of this
Transparency provision serving both sides could look like the following:
Transparency – Relevant Proposed Reconciled TTIP ISDS Sections
I. Documents Made Publicly Available.
(A) The following documents shall be made available to the public by the
arbitration tribunal repository:
(1) the Request for Consultation;
(2) the Notice of Arbitration;
(3) all written briefs, pleadings, and submissions made by any
disputing party;
(4) all witness statements and expert reports;
(5) all written submissions by non-disputing parties to the arbitration
tribunal;
277

U.S. Model, supra note 103, art. 29(1); EU Draft, supra note 126, Annex III, art. 1(2), 2(1), 3(1).
U.S. Model, supra note 103, art. 29(2); EU Draft, supra note 126, Annex III, art. 5(9-10).
279 U.S. Model, supra note 103, art. 29(4); EU Draft, supra note 126, Annex III, art. 5(4).
280 U.S. Model, supra note 103, art. 29(4).
281 EU Draft, supra note 126, Annex III, art. 5(4).
282 See infra Part I.C.
283 UNCITRAL, 46th session (July 8–26, 2013), A/CN.9/XLVI/CRP.3 (July 9, 2013) (as modified in
negotiations). See also EU Draft, supra note 126, art. 11.
278
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(6) all transcripts of the arbitration tribunal hearing; and
(7) all orders, awards, and decisions of the tribunal.
(B) The tribunal, with reasonable arrangements by disputing parties, shall
conduct all hearings in a manner open to the public.
(C) Any third party may request non-public documents from the
arbitration tribunal. The arbitration tribunal shall exercise prudent
discretion in granting requests.
II. Protection of Confidential Information.
(A) Protected information consists of:
(1) confidential business or trade information;
(2) information protected from public availability per this Agreement;
and
(3) information protected from public availability under the
applicable law or rules used by the arbitration tribunal.
(B) A party submitting a document containing information it deems to be
protected information shall submit an original and redacted document
to the arbitration tribunal. The party must attach a brief description of
the legal basis for why the document contains protected information.
(C) The arbitration tribunal shall decide whether any document or
information is protected before making the document or information
publicly available.
(1) Documents or information submitted to the arbitration tribunal
before a hearing shall be ruled publicly available or protected
before the hearing takes place. The arbitration tribunal shall make
arrangements to protect the document or information from
becoming public.
(2) Documents or information submitted after a hearing shall be ruled
publicly available or protected within 30 days of the arbitration
tribunal’s final order, award, or decision. A party disputing the
arbitration tribunal’s decision may present written or oral
argument regarding why the protected information shall remain
publicly unavailable.

4. Arbitration Tribunal Composition
Another important factor in ISDS is the composition of the actual arbitral
tribunal. The U.S. Model follows a more traditional approach, whereas the EU
Draft creates a new process of selecting arbitrators. The U.S. Model specifies
that “the tribunal shall comprise three arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by
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each of the disputing parties and the third, who shall be the presiding arbitrator,
appointed by agreement of the disputing parties.”284 Furthermore, the
Secretary-General of the ICSID acts as the appointing authority for all
arbitration proceedings.285
Contrary to the U.S. Model, the EU Draft develops a new methodology
implemented for all future EU IIAs in which: (1) each party proposes at least
five arbitrators of their own choosing; (2) each party selects at least five
arbitrators “who are not nationals of either Party to act as chairperson of the
tribunals;” and (3) additional arbitrators, as agreed upon by both parties during
the IIA’s execution.286 Furthermore, the EU Draft outlines that arbitrators
“shall have a specialised knowledge of international law, in particular
international public law and international investment law,” be independent of
affiliation with any government party to the IIA or disputing party, and not
receive any instruction or advice from any government or organization.287
The U.S. could mandate an essentially limitless potential number of
arbitrators, as it sees fit. Additionally, it would be in both parties’ interests to
require knowledgeable and independent arbitrators, more fitting with the EU
Draft requirements. The U.S. Model could require the EU to include in the
arbitral tribunal composition requirements that the Secretary-General of the
ICSID have final authority to select the neutral arbitrator from the lists of the
IIA’s contracting party not presently involved in the dispute. As such, this
concession would likely be debated, but would be an easier way to make the
selection process more predictable to parties and to potential arbitral tribunal
members awaiting selection.
A reconciled version of the following relevant sections of this Arbitration
Tribunal Composition provision serving both sides could look like the
following:

284
285
286
287

U.S. Model, supra note 103, art. 27(1).
Id. art. 27(2). See id. art. 1.
EU Draft, supra note 126, art. 8(6).
Id. art. 8(7).
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Arbitration Tribunal Composition – Relevant Proposed Reconciled TTIP
ISDS Sections
I. Arbitration Tribunal Composition.
(A) Unless the disputing parties agree to appoint a sole neutral arbitrator, the
arbitration tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators, one appointed by
each disputing party and a neutral chairperson, appointed by agreement of
the disputing parties.
(B) If parties agree to use a sole arbitrator, the disputing parties shall agree to
a sole arbitrator within 90 days of submission of the Notice. If a sole
arbitrator is not made within that time frame, a sole arbitrator shall be
selected by the Secretary-General of the ICSID, pursuant to the approved
list of chairpersons established in [Section XX] of this Chapter.
(C) If parties use an tribunal, the arbitration tribunal shall be constituted
within 90 days of submission of the Notice. If the arbitration tribunal is
not confirmed, the remaining members of the arbitration tribunal shall be
selected by the Secretary-General of the ICSID, pursuant to the approved
list of chairpersons established in Section II of this Chapter.
II. Arbitrators.
(A) At the execution of this Agreement, a Committee for the Settlement of
Investor-State Disputes shall be formed. That committee shall, before this
Agreement goes into effect, establish a list of individuals willing and able
to serve as arbitrators. At all times, this list shall include at least 15
individuals.
(B) Within 30 days of the submission of the Notice, each party shall propose
at least 5 individuals to serve as arbitrators. The parties shall propose at
least 5 individuals who are not nationals of either disputing party that may
act as a chairperson. In the case where one disputing party wishes to
propose more than 5 individuals to act as an arbitrator, the other party
may propose the same number of arbitrators. Parties may also agree to
increase the number of chairpersons accordingly.
III. Arbitrator Requirements.
(A) The Secretary-General of the ICSID shall not appoint a sole arbitrator or a
chairperson that is a national from either disputing party. In the case of a
chairperson, the composition of the arbitration tribunal shall not be
geographically unbalanced.
(B) All arbitrators shall:
(1) have specialized knowledge of international law, specifically
international public law and international investment law;
(2) have independence from disputing parties or their respective
governments;
(3) take no advice, instruction, or interest from any organization or
government, with respect to the matters in the dispute.

WEAVER GALLEYSPROOFS2

2014]

12/3/2014 8:59 AM

THE PROPOSED TRANSATLANTIC TRADE

273

5. Potential Appellate Mechanism
In addition to the ISDS provisions discussed, both IIA drafts for the U.S.
and the EU include potential appellate mechanisms for arbitral awards.288
The U.S. Model does not mention any desire to create a future appellate
body for arbitral decisions.289 Instead, the U.S. Model states that “in the event
that an appellate mechanism” is created to review arbitration awards, “the
parties shall consider” whether to subject awards of the TTIP (or any U.S. IIA)
to that mechanism.290 Furthermore, the U.S. Model states that any such
appellate mechanism should include the same transparency objectives
highlighted in Article 29 of the U.S. Model.291 Additionally, the EU Draft,
highlights that a within each IIA, a “Committee for the Settlement of InvestorState Disputes” shall be created with one purpose being to consider “under
what conditions an appellate mechanism could be created or integrated into the
current section (Article 19) to review, on points of law, awards rendered under
this section.”292 The EU Draft leaves open for consideration by both parties
whether “to create, or integrate” any appellate mechanism into the TTIP (or
any other future EU IIA), if it is desirable to both parties.293
As discussed above, geopolitical forces have been working on an appellate
mechanism. However, both the U.S. and EU have strong rule of law and very
similar ISDS provisions. For an appellate mechanism to be incorporated into
the TTIP for the purpose of reviewing awards, the U.S. and EU should strongly
consider whether the system created in the TTIP wishes to provide an appellate
mechanism (either between U.S., EU, or multilaterally) the jurisdiction to
review and amend arbitration awards. Reconciliation on that topic would likely
be a large amendment after considerable debate by both sides, and is an issue
likely to not find quick agreement by either side.
A reconciled version of the following relevant sections of this Potential
Appellate Mechanism provision serving both sides could look like the
following:

288
289
290
291
292
293

U.S. Model, supra note 103, art. 28(10); EU Draft, supra note 126, art. 19.
See U.S. Model, supra note 103, art. 28(10).
Id.
Id. See infra Part II.B.2.c. for an analysis regarding U.S. Model transparency objectives.
EU Draft, supra note 126, art. 19(2)(c).
Id.
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Potential Appellate Mechanism – Relevant Proposed Reconciled TTIP
ISDS Sections
I. Potential Appellate Mechanism.
(A) In the event that an appellate mechanism for reviewing awards
rendered by Investor-State Dispute Settlement arbitration is developed
as either an Amendment to this Agreement or a future institutional
arrangement, the Parties to this Agreement shall consider whether
awards rendered under this Agreement should be subject to that
appellate mechanism. The Parties shall strive to ensure that any such
appellate mechanism they consider adopting provides for transparency
of proceedings similar to the transparency provisions established in
Section [X – Transparency].
(B) Parties shall consider any issues related to jurisdiction issues with a
future appellate mechanism having the ability to review and amend
awards under this Agreement.

As discussed above, key ISDS provision differences between the U.S.
Model and the EU Draft can be reconciled after considering the objectives of
both U.S. and EU stakeholders. As such, this Comment proposes concludes
with a summary of the above stated analysis and recommendations.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. and the EU are viewed as the main regulatory actors of the world,
and may be responsible “for around 80 percent of the rules that regulate the
functioning of world markets.”294 Most important to this Comment, ISDS
provisions can be part of a vital agreement with massive future economic
implications for both the U.S. and the EU. Ongoing negotiations are vital to
ensuring both the U.S. and the EU will adequately consent to the final TTIP
text. Though this Comment has thoroughly analyzed ISDS provisions centered
on the TTIP, it is important to consider any potentially farther reaching global
implications beyond the TTIP.
A. Summary
Part I of this Comment provided a brief introduction to both IIAs and ISDS
provisions. Part II of the Comment highlighted the history of U.S. and EU IIAs
and the respective 2012 U.S. Model BIT text and the EU Draft text. Part II

294

Mavroidis, supra note 87, at 1565–88.
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further gave a short introduction to long-discussed multilateral agreement on
investment. Then, Part III discussed general investor protection provisions
included in almost all IIAs. Part IV considers the recent public backlash over
the TTIP and examines whether U.S. and EU negotiators are likely to move
forward with the agreement. Then, Part V provides original analysis on
specific ISDS provisions that will likely be negotiated between the U.S. and
EU for inclusion into the TTIP, and offers reconciliation for provisions
seemingly at odds. This Comment was largely limited in scope to specific
ISDS provisions used by the U.S. and the EU in past IIAs and their potential
inclusion in the currently negotiated TTIP. As such, there exist many areas of
the TTIP that will be researched and analyzed by future academics and
international practitioners.
B. Importance to International Community
ISDS provisions have become increasingly important protections for
international investments, and this trend will likely expand greatly if the TTIP
is finalized. Then, this Comment looked at the interplay between the public
and government while seeming to hint that a compromise on investment law
and public policy seems likely. It will take compromise on all stakeholders to
reach a deal that is mutually beneficial to all involved. Finally, this Comment
considered ISDS provisions generally and then examined the background of
U.S. Model and EU Draft texts concerning the specific provisions and possible
reconciliation. This Comment stresses a finalized TTIP would place a high
percentage of global output covered under one set ISDS provisions and has
global implications, regardless of whether the impact is only felt between the
U.S. and EU. The U.S.-EU TTIP could be an important development regarding
global trade, as roughly fifty percent of global economic output occurs
between these two parties.295 International adjudication in a post-TTIP world
would likely never again be “marginal to world affairs.”296
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